My research in metaphysics so far has focused on a view called 'pluralism about being'. Pluralism about being is the view that there are many ways of being. Someone believing in ways of being may want to appeal to them when describing fundamental differences such as the difference between Margaret Thatcher, and Larry, the cat living in 10 Downing Street.
One of the things that people discuss is whether it makes sense to hold that there are many ways of being. I have defended that there is a way (no pun indended) in which pluralists can hold their view without the problems that have been recently pointed out in recent literature. A defence of this view was the main objective in my BA dissertation.
One of the things that people discuss is whether it makes sense to hold that there are many ways of being. I have defended that there is a way (no pun indended) in which pluralists can hold their view without the problems that have been recently pointed out in recent literature. A defence of this view was the main objective in my BA dissertation.
Works in progress
'Hybridism and the Problem of Purity: A Pluralist Reply'Please, email me for a draft of this paper.
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In this paper, I defend that there is a way out David Builes's dilemma concerning the problem of Purity for pluralism-about-being theories. Pluralism about being is the view that there are many way of being. I hold that there is a version of a pluralist theory 'Hybridism' which does not face that problem. Hybridism is the view that there are many (specific) ways of being, that there is a generic way of being, and that the generic way of being is just as fundamental as the several specific ways of being. Thought the view has never been defended in the literature, it solves many difficulties that other pluralist views do.
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BA dissertation
The Problem of Mixed Inferences |
In my BA thesis I defend a solution to the problem of mixed inferences posed by Peter van Inwagen. The problem of mixed inferences is the problem of not having adequate defined notion of logical consequence for arguments formulated by pluralists. Pluralists appeal to both a generic way of being (ways of being had by all things) and more than one specific ways of being (ways of being had by some but not all things).
I hold that the problem of mixed inferences is grounded on what I call 'the problem of mixed inferences', which is the problem of not having an account of the truth of sentences that involve both the generic way of being and at least one specific way of being. (Which is a differnt way of saying that pluralists face Builes' dilemma.) I defend the view that in order to have an account of the truth of such sentences one has to take all modes of being (the generic and the specifics) as equally fundamental. In the first chapter, I present the problem of mixed inferences. second chapter I devote the third chapter to explain my solution of the problem of mixed sentences, and adress some of the most important objections to be raised against my solution. |
Research Programmes
Fellow Research Students Programme2016 - 2020
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This programme is coordinated by the National Autonomous University of Mexico's Institute of Philosophical Research. The Programme aims to foster research done by Philosophy students at UNAM and give them training for doing so under the supervision of one of the Intitute's researchers. My supervisor was Alessandro Torza.
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